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Recent Developments: Broussard v. State and the Not
So Obvious Application of the Open and Obvious
Doctrine
John M. Church∗
INTRODUCTION
Every jurisdiction must determine the circumstances in which a
tort defendant may be relieved of liability because of the nature of
the fault or defect. In Broussard v. State,1 the Louisiana Supreme
Court restricted one of the defenses available to defendants when it
revisited the open and obvious doctrine announced in 1996 in Pitre
v. Louisiana Tech.2 While the Broussard Court purportedly
preserved the open and obvious doctrine, the case represents a
significant and important limitation on the availability of the
defense. Indeed, it could be argued that the limitation announced in
Broussard effectively eliminates the open and obvious nature of the
defect as an independent defense. Thus, Broussard could be one of
the most important Louisiana tort cases decided in more than a
decade.
I. BROUSSARD V. STATE: RESTRICTING THE SCOPE OF THE OPEN AND
OBVIOUS DOCTRINE
A. Factual Background
Paul Broussard, a United Parcel Service (UPS) deliveryman,
sued the State of Louisiana for damages he sustained in an accident
on January 23, 2001, while loading a dolly into a misaligned
elevator in Wooddale Tower in Baton Rouge.3 The Wooddale
Tower is a state-owned office building with 12 stories and two
elevators in the lobby.4 In 1998, Wooddale Tower’s roof was
repaired, and the repair efforts generated a large volume of dust and
debris.5 Over time, the construction dust and debris settled and
accrued in the elevator relay, triggering the elevators to “operate
Copyright 2014, by JOHN M. CHURCH.
∗ Harry S. Redmon, J.Y. Sanders, and Allen L. Smith, Jr. Associate Professor
of Law, Louisiana State University, Paul M. Hebert Law Center.
1. See Broussard v. State ex rel. Office of State Bldgs., 113 So. 3d 175,
178−79 (La. 2013).
2. Pitre v. La. Tech Univ., 673 So. 2d 585 (La. 1996).
3. Broussard, 113 So. 3d at 178−80.
4. Id. at 179.
5. Id.
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erratically” for a period of several years.6 The built-up dust and
debris caused the elevators to stop in between floors, forming an
offset of space between the elevator floor and the building floors.7
The space would range from a few inches to a few feet.8 The
malfunctioning of the elevators and offset space did not go without
notice by the tenants of Wooddale Tower, and several tenants
expressed their concern of a future accident between 1999 and
2000.9 The State proposed plans to fix the elevators in response to
the complaints; however, the bidding was not completed until June
20, 2001.10
Prior to the accident, Broussard was an employee of UPS for 11
years, and he worked as a delivery-truck driver for 7 of those
years.11 Broussard made daily deliveries to Wooddale Tower and
was fully aware of the building’s elevator problems.12 On the day of
the accident, Broussard was attempting to deliver six boxes of
computer paper on a dolly, weighing 300 pounds, to the eighth
floor.13 One of the elevators was already open when Broussard
entered the lobby, and the elevator was elevated between one and a
half to three inches above the lobby floor.14 Two people had entered
the elevator prior to Broussard, and one of the occupants testified
that Broussard initially put the dolly in front of his body and tried to
push the dolly into the elevator.15 The misalignment of the elevator
and the ground floor prevented Broussard from being able to push
the dolly in, so he turned around, stepped backward into the
elevator, and attempted to pull the dolly into the elevator shaft.16 As
he was pulling the dolly backward, Broussard cleared the gap, but
he soon lost control of the dolly and was forcefully propelled back
into the elevator.17 As a result of the accident, Broussard suffered a
serious back injury, was diagnosed with a centrally-herniated,
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. Employees of the Department of Social Services, one of the tenants of
Wooddale Tower, even sent a memorandum to their supervisor on July 10, 2000,
in which they expressed their concern that the elevators (1) would not stop in a
position level with the building floors, causing employees to trip upon entering or
exiting the elevator shaft and (2) would drop between a few inches and feet when
people would enter or exit the elevator shaft. Id.
10. Id. at 179–80.
11. Id. at 180.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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degenerative disc, and could no longer perform his duties as a UPS
deliveryman because his doctors advised him against heavy lifting.18
B. Procedural History
After a three-day trial on August 23–26, 2010, the jury found in
Broussard’s favor, concluding that the space between the lobby and
elevator floors created an unreasonable risk of harm and Broussard
was 38% at fault.19 The jury found that Broussard suffered
$1,589,890.23 in damages but reduced this number to $985,732.56
to account for his comparative fault.20 On appeal by the State, the
First Circuit reversed, finding that the district court’s conclusion that
the offset created an unreasonable risk of harm was manifestly
erroneous.21 The First Circuit applied the four-prong, risk–utility
balancing test22 to determine that the offset did not create an
unreasonable risk of harm because the social utility of the elevator
offset the risk of the faulty but readily apparent condition of the
elevator.23 The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the decision of
the First Circuit finding that the offset of space represented an
unreasonable risk of harm and the faulty condition of the elevator
was not an open and obvious hazard.24
C. Law and Analysis
In Broussard, the Louisiana Supreme Court noted that the owner
of the building was only responsible for injuries caused by
conditions that create an unreasonable risk of harm.25 Whether a
condition creates an unreasonable risk of harm is a mixed question
of law, fact, and policy; the Court in Broussard determined that the
question was for the trier of fact and should be determined at the
breach and not the duty stage.26 The trier of fact utilized a fourprong, risk–utility balancing test to determine whether the condition
was unreasonably dangerous:
Id.

18. Id. Specifically, Broussard was advised not to lift more than 70 pounds.

19. Id. at 180−81.
20. Id. at 181.
21. Id. See also Broussard v. State, No. 11–0479, 2012 WL 1079182 (La. Ct.
App. Mar. 30, 2012).
22. See, e.g., Pryor v. Iberia Parish Sch. Bd., 60 So. 3d 594, 597 (La. 2011)
(per curiam); Pitre v. La. Tech Univ., 673 So. 2d 585, 591–93 (La. 1996).
23. Broussard, 113 So. 3d at 181.
24. Id. at 194.
25. Id. at 183 (citing Entrevia v. Hood, 427 So. 2d 1146, 1148–49 (La.
1983)).
26. Id. at 183–85.
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(1) the utility of the complained-of condition;
(2) the likelihood and magnitude of harm, including the
obviousness and apparentness of the condition;
(3) the cost of preventing the harm; and
(4) the nature of the plaintiff’s activities in terms of its social
utility or whether it is dangerous by nature.27
In discussing the magnitude of the harm and the open and
obviousness of the risk, the Court concluded that the “elevators
presented a significant and likely risk of harm” and that “the State had
a heightened degree of care precisely because these elevators were
malfunctioning and had become dangerous instrumentalities.”28 In
examining whether the open and obvious doctrine applied, the Court
emphasized that the plaintiff’s individual knowledge of the risk is not
the proper standard but knowledge by all who might use the elevator
is required.29 Otherwise, the Court noted that the individual plaintiff’s
awareness or knowledge of a condition is just one Watson factor to be
considered in the assessment of comparative fault.30 The Court
concluded that even though Broussard and the other occupant of the
elevator at the time of the accident knew of the elevator problems,
there were enough recorded instances of employees tripping or falling
on the misaligned elevator that could lead a reasonable jury to
conclude that the misalignment of the elevators was not open and
obvious to all.31
II. THE LOUISIANA OPEN AND OBVIOUS DOCTRINE: FROM MURRAY
TO PITRE
The open and obvious doctrine has its beginnings in the notion
that landowners were immune from liability related to their land.32
Landowners had no duty to protect invitees from obvious conditions
because “invitees [were], in most circumstances, expected to protect
27. Id. at 184 (emphasis added).
28. Id. at 187. The Court noted that this heightened duty made this case
different from an ordinary slip and fall case. Id.
29. Id. at 188.
30. Id. at 188–89. See Watson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 469 So. 2d
967, 974 (La. 1985) (adopting the Uniform Comparative Fault Act for the fact
finder to assess the nature of the conduct of the parties through a set of five factors
and to aid in assigning fault percentages to the parties).
31. Broussard, 113 So. 3d at 190.
32. See 65A C.J.S. Negligence § 741 (“A landowner is not liable for injury
resulting from a condition which should have been observed by an individual in
the exercise of reasonable care or which was as obvious to a visitor as to the
landowner.”).
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themselves from obvious dangers.”33 Moreover, a victim who
“assumed the risk” or voluntarily embraced the risk was unable to
recover from the tortfeasor,34 and the defendant could use this
argument as an affirmative defense.35 Similarly, at common law, a
tortfeasor who was negligent in any way or assumed the risk was
deemed to have been “contributorily negligent,” and any amount of
negligence would completely bar recovery.36 However, the doctrine
of contributory negligence has been abandoned in most states,
including Louisiana, and Louisiana has now opted for a pure
comparative fault system in which both the tort victim and tortfeasor
are assigned a percentage of fault.37 Under a comparative fault
system, the plaintiff’s recovery is not completely barred but limited
by his or her own contributory negligence.38 There is necessarily an
overlap between conduct that would be classified as negligent and
conduct that would be classified as an assumption of the risk. So as
many states began to turn away from contributory negligence to a
comparative fault system, the question remained whether
assumption of the risk would be an affirmative and complete
defense to any recovery from the tortfeasor or merely reduce or limit
the plaintiff’s ability to recover.39 The Louisiana experience is
described below.
A. Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc.
In 1988, in Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., the Louisiana Supreme
Court determined the continued viability of the assumption of the
risk doctrine in a certified question from the U.S. Fifth Circuit.40
Although the Louisiana Legislature had eliminated contributory
fault, it did not specifically address the role of assumption of the risk
33. James P. End, The Open and Obvious Doctrine: Where Does It Belong in
Our Comparative Negligence Regime?, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 445, 457–58 (2000).
34. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1965).
35. See id. cmt. b.
36. See, e.g., Soileau v. S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 398 So. 2d 648 (La. Ct. App.
1981).
37. For a thorough discussion of the development of comparative fault in
Louisiana, see Frank L. Maraist, H. Alston Johnson III, Thomas C. Galligan, Jr. &
William R. Corbett, Answering a Fool According to His Folly: Rumination on
Comparative Fault Thirty Years On, 70 LA. L. REV. 1105 (2010). A pure
comparative fault system is one in which the plaintiff’s ability to recover is not
barred if the plaintiff’s fault exceeds or equals the defendant’s percentage of fault.
Id. at 1108.
38. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2323 (2014).
39. Murray v. Ramada Inn, Inc., 821 F.2d 272, 273 (5th Cir. 1987), certifying
question to 521 So. 2d 1123, 1132 (La. 1988).
40. 521 So. 2d 1123 (La. 1988).
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in the new comparative fault regime.41 In Murray, the Louisiana
Supreme Court held that the assumption of the risk doctrine is not a
discrete, affirmative defense but its application is embraced in the
comparative fault system.42 In Murray, the plaintiff twice dove into a
shallow motel pool and on his third dive, suffered a serious injury that
eventually led to his death.43 The Court determined that Murray’s
decedents’ recovery was not barred by whether he knew or should
have known of the risk that he assumed.44 The type of assumption of
the risk embraced by the comparative fault system is known as
“implied secondary.”45 The Court reasoned that because the
Legislature abolished contributory negligence and implied secondary
assumption of the risk was “in reality a form of contributory
negligence,” implied secondary assumption of the risk should not
operate as an affirmative defense.46
However, there are two situations where the Murray Court
suggested that the plaintiff’s conduct would apply as an affirmative
and complete defense.47 The first is an “express consent” case when
the plaintiff explicitly releases the defendant from any liability.48
The second type of conduct is when a plaintiff places him or herself
in a situation to face “virtually unpreventable risks,” which the
Murray Court noted was called “implied primary” assumption of the
risk by many jurisdictions.49 Implied primary cases involve a
“particular activity or situation” in which the plaintiff is deemed to
have consented to the risk, although no “express” waiver was
given.50 In Murray, the Supreme Court offered the “textbook
example” of a sports spectator who is struck by a fly ball at a
baseball game.51 In such a situation, the plaintiff would be deemed
to have assumed the risk by his or her attendance at the game, and
his or her ability to recover would be completely barred by the
theory of implied primary assumption of the risk.52 Although the
Court effectively removed assumption of the risk as a defense, the
41. See id. at 1132; Murray, 821 F.2d at 273.
42. Murray, 521 So. 2d at 1124 (holding that a swimmer’s knowledge of the
dangerousness of diving into a shallow pool did not bar recovery against the
Ramada Inn motel owner and operator who failed to provide a lifeguard in
violation of Louisiana law or signs warning against shallow water).
43. Id. at 1125.
44. Id. at 1134.
45. Id. at 1129.
46. Id. at 1125.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1129.
51. Id. at 1125.
52. See id.
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Murray Court’s language preserves a class of cases where the
defendant will be completely relieved from liability. The recognition
in Murray that no-liability cases persist after the abolition of the
assumption of the risk defense ultimately led to the open and
obvious doctrine.
B. Washington v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.
Two years after Murray, “one might have thought that the dutyrisk analysis in a case involving an open and obvious risk would not
involve any judicial inquiry or consideration of the plaintiff’s actual
knowledge of the risk.”53 However, in Washington v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., the Court took the plaintiff’s knowledge of the
unreasonably dangerous condition to determine that the defendant–
power company had a duty to the plaintiff but there was no breach
of that duty.54 In Washington, the victim, Washington, was
electrocuted when his radio antenna came into contact with a high
voltage wire in his backyard.55 Five years prior to that fatal accident,
Washington’s antenna had come into contact with the power line,
shocking and burning Washington and his son.56 After that first
accident, “he expressed concern for his life and afterward exercised
great caution” when dealing with the antenna.57 After “his close
call,” Washington requested that the power company insulate the
power line or move it underground, but the power company told
Washington that this action could only be undertaken at
Washington’s expense.58 The trial court found in favor of
Washington; however, the Fourth Circuit determined that because of
Washington’s past experience with the power line and his
carefulness in handling the antenna after the first accident, the power
company did not breach its duty.59 Then Justice Dennis, writing for
the Louisiana Supreme Court, affirmed the Fourth Circuit’s
determination and applied a cost–benefit analysis to determine that
the defendant was not liable because of the low probability that the
antenna would make contact with the power line (and the resulting
damage) was outweighed by the benefits of the line and the cost to
insulate.60 While Justice Dennis characterized the case as a “nobreach” case, at least one scholar has argued that it was really a “no53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Maraist, et al., supra note 37, at 1115.
555 So. 2d 1350 (La. 1990).
Id. at 1351.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1352.
Id. at 1353.
Id. at 1353–55.
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duty” case.61 Moreover, the consideration of Washington’s actual
knowledge in determining breach seems to be contrary to the
holding in Murray.
In deciding that there was no breach of the applicable standard
of care, the Court considered Washington’s actual knowledge of the
risk of danger from the distribution line in his backyard to conclude
that the probability of an accident occurring was extremely low.62
This low probability led to the no-breach (or perhaps no-duty)
conclusion.63 The plaintiff’s knowledge essentially entered the case
“through the back door,” not to simply reduce recovery but to bar
it.64 One may argue that the decision in Washington is technically
consistent with the Murray duty analysis because the Court was not
considering actual knowledge to define duty. However, actual
knowledge was considered to conclude that there had been no
breach of the relevant duty.65 The result in either case was the same:
no recovery. Likewise, note that if Washington is a breach case, the
Court made the decision about breach, not the jury; the jury had
concluded that, in fact, there was liability, including breach.66
C. Pitre v. Louisiana Tech University
The open and obvious doctrine was most clearly defined in Pitre
v. Louisiana Tech University.67 In Pitre, a rare winter ice and
snowstorm occurred in Ruston, Louisiana.68 Pitre and three other
Louisiana Tech students arranged themselves on top of a trashcan
lid, head first, and another student pushed them, launching the
“sled” down the hill.69 Pitre hit a concrete light pole in Tech’s
61. See Maraist et al., supra note 37, at 1117−18.
62. See Washington, 555 So. 2d at 1353−54.
63. See id. at 1353–55.
64. Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So. 2d 1123, 1136 (La. 1988) (noting
that if the plaintiff’s knowledge were used to define the duty that assumption of
the risk would be retained as a total and complete bar to recovery).
If accepted, defendants’ argument [that the tort victim’s knowledge
barred recovery] would inject the assumption of risk doctrine into
duty/risk analysis “through the back door.” By that, we mean that the
argument attempts to define the defendant’s initial duty in terms of the
plaintiff’s actual knowledge, and thereby seeks to achieve the same result
which would be reached if assumption of risk were retained as a defense,
i.e., a total bar to the plaintiff’s recovery.
Id.
65. See Washington, 555 So. 2d at 1353−55.
66. See id. at 1353; see also Maraist, et al., supra note 37, at 1118.
67. 673 So. 2d 585 (La. 1996).
68. Id. at 586–87.
69. Id. at 586−88.
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parking lot on his descent and sustained serious spinal injuries.70
The Court clarified that a relevant inquiry of the duty–risk analysis
of negligence is the obviousness and apparentness of the potentially
dangerous condition, and if that condition “should be obvious to
all,” the defendant does not owe a duty to the plaintiff.71 Therefore,
Justice Victory concluded, “Tech had no duty since the light pole
was obvious and apparent and the risks of colliding with it while
sledding are known to everyone.”72
In Pitre, the majority determined that the issue of potential
negligence for Tech was an issue of “no duty.”73 However, Justice
Lemmon in his concurrence reasoned that this was actually a case in
which there was a general duty, but there was no breach.74
Moreover, scholars have noted that in Pitre the Court focused on the
question of duty but still performed the cost–benefit analysis that is
used when determining whether there has been a breach.75 However,
it was this same cost–benefit analysis that was used to determine
that the power company in Washington did not breach its duty.76
Moreover, in the wake of Murray, Washington, and Pitre, the
Louisiana Supreme Court continued to tie the question of whether a
duty existed to a duty–risk analysis for breach of a duty.77 The Pitre
Court then relied on its opinion in Murray to determine that the
individual plaintiff’s state of mind is not the correct measurement of
the defendant’s duty, but the duty should be determined by that
which the defendant owes to all people who were on campus on the
evening of the accident and not just to Pitre himself.78
III. APPLYING PITRE: APPLICATION OF THE OPEN AND OBVIOUS
DOCTRINE IS NOT SO OBVIOUS
In Pitre, the Court signaled that defendants could avoid liability
where, as a result of a risk or defect being open and obvious, the
70. Id. at 587−88.
71. Id. at 591.
72. Id. at 586.
73. Id. at 590−91.
74. Id. at 596.
75. See Maraist, et al, supra note 37, at 1122; Thomas C. Galligan, Jr.,
Revisiting the Patterns of Negligence: Some Ramblings Inspired by Robertson, 57
LA. L. REV. 1119, 1121 (1997).
76. See Washington v. La. Power & Light Co., 555 So. 2d 1350, 1353−54
(La. 1990).
77. See Maraist et al., supra note 37, at 1125 (citing Hutchinson v. Knights of
Columbus, Council No. 5747, 866 So. 2d 228 (La. 2004)).
78. Pitre v. La. Tech Univ., 673 So. 2d 585, 590−91 (La. 1996) (citing
Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So. 2d 1123, 1136 (La. 1988)).
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condition did not represent an unreasonable risk of harm.79
However, the lower courts applied the doctrine inconsistently.
Rather than developing a consistent standard, lower courts struggled
to apply an uncertain doctrine. By analyzing a number of lower
court cases that applied a version of the open and obvious doctrine,
some patterns are revealed. First, the number of cases appeared to be
increasing. From 1998 to 2005, there were 26 cases discussing the
open and obvious doctrine.80 From 2006 to 2013, there were 55.81
Thirty cases relied on the doctrine to relieve the defendant of
liability.82 However, only 20 of the cases applying the open and
obvious doctrine utilized a detailed risk–utility analysis like that
performed in Pitre and, ultimately, Broussard.83 While this statistic
is far from scientific, it does reveal that lower courts were uncertain
about the proper application of the open and obvious doctrine.
As a result, the Broussard Court took the opportunity to clarify
the doctrine.84 First, the Court clarified that the standard for defining
an “open and obvious” risk is that it must be actually open and
obvious to all.85 The actual knowledge of the plaintiff is irrelevant
because such a standard would be the equivalent of assumption of
the risk, a doctrine eliminated by the Legislature, as interpreted by
the Court in Murray.86 Second, the Court clarified that the fact that
the defect was open and obvious is just a part of the larger risk–
utility analysis, the analysis applied in virtually all fault-based cases
to determine if the condition represented an unreasonable risk.87 The
notion of the open and obvious risk analysis as a part of the
unreasonable risk analysis is consistent with Pitre but, as revealed
above, was not universally applied by the lower courts or even the
79. See supra Part II.C.
80. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Knights of Columbus, Council No. 5747, 866
So. 2d 228 (La. 2004); McGuire v. New Orleans City Park Imp. Ass’n., 835 So.
2d 416 (La. 2003); Robertson v. State, 747 So. 2d 1276 (La. Ct. App. 1999).
81. See, e.g., Trautmann v. Fitzgerald, 113 So. 3d 429 (La. Ct. App. 2013);
Watts v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 43 So. 3d 266 (La. Ct. App. 2010); Jeansonne v. S.
Cent. Bell Telephone Co., 8 So. 3d 613 (La. Ct. App. 2009); Leonard v. Ryan’s
Family Steak Houses, Inc., 939 So. 2d 401 (La. Ct. App. 2006).
82. See, e.g., Babino v. Jefferson Transit, 110 So. 3d 1123 (La. Ct. App.
2013).
83. See, e.g., Smalley v. Ransonet, No. CA 13-522, 2013 WL 5951509 (La.
Ct. App. Nov. 6, 2013).
84. See Broussard v. State ex rel. Office of State Bldgs., 113 So. 3d 175 (La.
2013).
85. Id. at 188.
86. Id. (“Our ‘open and obvious to all’ principle is not a hollow maxim.
Rather, it serves an invaluable function, preventing concepts such as assumption
of the risk from infiltrating our jurisprudence.”).
87. Id. at 185.
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Supreme Court.88 Finally, the Court ruled that the open and obvious
doctrine is a question of breach, rather than duty.89 This issue had
been highlighted in both Washington and Pitre, with judges and
scholars on both sides of the issue.90 However, the Pitre Court
unequivocally treated the question of whether the defect was open
and obvious as a part of the duty element.91 The importance of
treating the question as part of the breach analysis, which is a
question of fact, is that it is much more likely that cases will be
submitted to the jury.92 Whether this benefits plaintiffs or defendants
is an open question, but the strategy employed by the parties will
clearly change as a result of Broussard.
The following Section reveals that the Louisiana experience
with the open and obvious doctrine is consistent with the experience
in other jurisdictions.
IV. OPEN AND OBVIOUS HAZARDS: DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON
LAW DOCTRINE
With roots in English and early American common law and
most likely derived from the political power of landowners prior to
the 20th century, the open and obvious doctrine eliminates
landowner liability to business visitors resulting from open and
obvious dangers.93 “The rationale of the open and obvious doctrine
is that the defendant should not be held liable for harm caused by a
danger that was open and obvious to the person suffering the
88. Id. at 191 (“Admittedly, it appears our recent per curiam opinions have
produced a patchwork of inconsistent jurisprudence. . . . There is no bright-line
rule. The fact-intensive nature of our risk-utility analysis will inevitably lead to
divergent results.”).
89. Id. at 185−86.
90. See Maraist et al., supra note 37, at 1110 (describing the long academic
debate between professor and practitioner Alston Johnson and Professor David
Robertson on victim fault and scope of the risk).
91. Pitre v. La. Tech Univ., 673 So. 2d 585, 590−91 (La. 1996).
92. See Mundy v. Dep’t of Health and Human Res., 620 So. 2d 811, 813 (La.
1993) (opining that whether a duty is owed is a question of law, but whether a
defendant has breached a duty is a question of fact).
93. Michalski v. Home Depot, Inc., 225 F.3d 113, 118–19 (2d Cir. 2000)
(outlining the transformation of the open and obvious doctrine). See
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 340 (1934) (providing that “a possessor of land is not
subject to liability to his licensees . . . for bodily harm caused to them by any
dangerous condition thereon, whether natural or artificial, if they know of the
condition and realize the risk involved therein”); James P. End, Comment, The
Open and Obvious Danger Doctrine: Where Does It Belong in Our Comparative
Negligence Regime?, 84 MARQ. L. REV. 445, 457 (2000) (“Landowner
sovereignty resulted from the belief that landowners possessed the right to use
their land as they so chose.”).
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harm.”94 The open and obvious doctrine was widely criticized by
legal scholars and courts as being too harsh, however, and courts
began to depart from it in the mid-20th century.95 In 1965, the
Restatement (Second) of Torts was published, recognizing this trend
and modifying its assessment of the open and obvious doctrine so
that “[a] possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physical
harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose
danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should
anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.”96 As a
result, jurisdictions throughout the country have retreated from strict
application of the open and obvious doctrine, departing “from the
traditional rule absolving, ipso facto, owners and occupiers of land
from liability for injuries resulting from known or obvious
conditions, and [moving] toward the standard expressed in section
343A(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965).”97
Under the Second Restatement, a landowner should anticipate,
and is liable for failing to remedy, the risk of harm from obvious
hazards when an invitee could be distracted from observing or
avoiding the dangerous condition or may forget what he or she has
discovered, and the landowner has “reason to expect that the invitee
will nevertheless suffer physical harm.”98 This principle is known as
the “distraction exception” to the open and obvious rule.99 For
example, a landowner should anticipate that, in certain circumstances,

94. Robert A. Sedler, The Constitution, the Courts and the Common Law, 53
WAYNE L. REV. 153, 172 (2007).
95. See James Fleming, Jr., Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties Owed
to Licensees and Invitees, 63 YALE L.J. 605, 628 (1954); Page Keeton, Personal
Injuries Resulting from Open and Obvious Conditions, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 629,
642–43 (1952); see, e.g., Hanson v. Town & Country Shopping Ctr., Inc., 144
N.W.2d 870, 874 (Iowa 1966) (“To arbitrarily deny liability for open or obvious
defects and apply liability only for hidden defects, traps, or pitfalls, is to adopt a
rigid rule based on objective classification in place of the concept of the care of a
reasonable and prudent man under the particular circumstances.”).
96. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A(1) (1965).
97. Ward v. K Mart Corp., 554 N.E.2d 223, 231 (Ill. 1990) (listing cases from
state supreme courts that have adopted the Second Restatement approach). See
Kentucky River Med. Ctr. v. McIntosh, 319 S.W.3d 385, 390 (Ky. 2010) (“[T]he
modern trend, as embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, is the better
position.”). But see Jones Food Co., Inc. v. Shipman, 981 So. 2d 355, 363 (Ala.
2006) (holding that no duty was owed with regard to open and obvious dangers);
Armstrong v. Best Buy Co. Inc., 788 N.E.2d 1088, 1091 (Ohio 2003) (holding
same).
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A cmt. f (1965).
99. Id. See Kenneth R. Swift, I Couldn’t Watch the Ball Because I Was
Watching the Ferris Wheel in Centerfield, 22 ENT. & SPORTS LAW 1, 34 (2005)
(noting that comment f has been extensively applied by numerous jurisdictions).
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store displays will distract customers and potentially prevent them
from discovering and avoiding even conspicuous dangers.
This principle was exemplified in the 2000 U.S. Second Circuit
Court of Appeals opinion Michalski v. Home Depot.100 In Michalski,
a customer of a warehouse store was injured when she tripped and
fell over a pallet left on a forklift while walking down an aisle to
view and purchase bathroom cabinets.101 The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the warehouse store, finding that the
pallet was an open and obvious danger.102 In predicting New York
law, the Second Circuit applied the reasoning espoused by the
Second Restatement and held that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment against the patron because questions of material
fact existed as to whether the store was liable, either because the
condition was made unreasonably dangerous due to the fact that
customers would not anticipate encountering it in that location or
because it was reasonably foreseeable that customers would be
distracted by merchandise from observing the pallet near the
floor.103 The court rejected the traditional approach, stating that “even
obvious dangers may create a foreseeable risk of harm and
consequently give rise to a duty to protect or warn on the part of the
landowner.”104 The Michalski court recognized that:
[T]he open and obvious nature of a dangerous condition on
its property does not relieve a landowner from a duty of care
where harm from an open and obvious hazard is readily
foreseeable by the landowner and the landowner has reason
to know that the visitor might not expect or be distracted
from observing the hazard.105
By relying on the modified rule, the Second Circuit, like courts
across the country, upheld the general duty of reasonable care.106
The general duty of reasonable care is the focus of the newly
adopted Restatement (Third) of Torts: Physical and Emotional Harm
section 51:
[A] land possessor owes a duty of reasonable care to entrants
on the land with regard to:
(a) conduct by the land possessor that creates risks to
entrants on the land;
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Michalski v. Home Depot, Inc., 225 F.3d 113, 115 (2d. Cir. 2000).
Id. at 115.
Id. at 116.
Id. at 121.
Id. at 119.
Id. at 121.
Id. at 120.
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(b) artificial conditions on the land that pose risks to
entrants on the land;
(c) natural conditions on the land that pose risks to entrants
on the land; and
(d) other risks to entrants on the land when any of the
affirmative duties . . . is applicable.107
The duty espoused in the newest iteration is similar to, and
includes, both the general landowner’s duty imposed with regard to
invitees in the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 343 and the
distraction exception to the open and obvious rule reflected in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 343A.108 Thus, under the
Third Restatement, landowners bear a general duty of reasonable
care to all entrants, regardless of the open and obvious nature of
dangerous conditions. The “duty issue must be analyzed with regard
to foreseeability and gravity of harm, and the feasibility and
availability of alternative conduct that would have prevented the
harm.”109 While the open and obvious nature of the conditions does
not automatically preclude liability, it is part of assessing whether
reasonable care was employed.110 In considering whether reasonable
care was taken, the fact-finder must also take into account the
surrounding circumstances, such as whether nearby displays were
distracting and whether the landowner had reason to suspect that the
entrant would proceed despite a known or obvious danger.111

107. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 51
(2012).
108. Id. § 51 cmts. a and k.
109. Coln v. City of Savannah, 966 S.W.2d 34, 43 (Tenn. 1998), overruled on
other grounds by Cross v. City of Memphis, 20 S.W.3d 642, 644 (Tenn. 2000).
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 51 cmt. i
(2012).
110. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 51
cmt. k (2012).
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343A cmt. f (1965). See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 51 cmt. k
(2012) (explaining that a warning ordinarily would be futile when the danger is
open and obvious).
Known or obvious dangers pose a reduced risk compared to comparable
latent dangers because those exposed can take precautions to protect
themselves. Nevertheless, in some circumstances, a residual risk will
remain despite the opportunity of entrants to avoid an open and obvious
risk.
Id.
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V. THE LOUISIANA VERSION OF THE OPEN AND OBVIOUS DOCTRINE:
AN ASSESSMENT
Scholars and judges seem to be in agreement that there is a class
of cases where the defendant should be relieved of liability because
the defect is so apparent that the defendant’s conduct does not
represent an unreasonable risk.112 The relevant question is whether
the open and obvious doctrine adequately captures those cases. The
corollary question is whether the open and obvious doctrine is even
capable of capturing those cases. States that have addressed the issue
have answered these questions in a variety of ways, ranging from
the elimination of the doctrine, to the preservation of the doctrine
with a distraction exception, to the retention of the doctrine in its
historical, defendant-friendly form.113 In Broussard, the Louisiana
Supreme Court technically retained the rule but signaled that it
should simply be a part of the risk–utility analysis that is part of
every fault-based case, a result consistent with the latest trend.114
The necessity for the change from Pitre is demonstrated by the
facts and procedure of Broussard itself.115 The facts indicate that
others had tripped over and complained about the gap prior to Mr.
Broussard’s injury, indicating that this was not a defect “known to
all.”116 Thus, the desirable result is that the State take some
precautionary action and eliminate the defective condition.
Similarly, Mr. Broussard certainly bears some share of fault. In fact,
the jury allocated a percentage of fault to Mr. Broussard.117 On the
facts, the result in Broussard is defensible and, perhaps, correct.
In addition, a significant number of lower courts were applying
the open and obvious doctrine without a careful risk–utility analysis,
effectively eliminating the distraction exception recognized in most
jurisdictions that retain the doctrine.118
The more difficult question concerns the implication of the
principle announced in Broussard. Most jurisdictions recognize that
even open and obvious risks may be unreasonable.119 Thus, most
cases should go to the jury to be evaluated under the typical risk–
utility standard announced in Broussard and Pitre.120 However, the
Court may have restricted judicial freedom to the point of
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

See supra Part IV.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Parts I, IV.
See supra Part I.
See supra Part I.
See supra Part I.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part IV.
See supra Part III.
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effectively eliminating the open and obvious doctrine. Only time
will tell whether the standard announced by the Court will properly
identify those single-care cases where the defendant should be
relieved of liability.

